
Welcome

Monday, August 1, 2016

The Fifth Estate





Identities

What are they?

Why do we need them?

Is there an ID craze now? Is it a craze?

Why?

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Stated Purpose of UID

Purpose:

- To <u>**CREATE</u> A UNIQUE IDENTITY <u>NUMBER**</u> FOR EVERY RESIDENT IN INDIA</u>
- (See UIDAI website <u>UIDAI Strategic Overview</u>)
- [https://uidai.gov.in/UID_PDF/Front_Page_Arti cles/Documents/Strategy_Overveiw-001.pdf]



Stated Rationale of UID - 1

"In India, an inability to prove identity is one of the biggest barriers preventing the poor from accessing benefits and subsidies."

"--- there remains no nationally accepted, verified identity <u>number</u> that both residents and agencies can use with ease and confidence."



Stated Rationale of UID - 2

"The purpose of the UIDAI is to issue a unique identification <u>number</u> (UID) to all Indian <u>residents</u> that is (a) robust enough to <u>eliminate</u> duplicate and fake identities, and (b) can be verified and authenticated in an easy, costeffective way"



Questions on UID

Let's ask and answer some questions to understand the UID hoax



Questions - 1

- How are subsidies in LPG, in PDS etc. stolen?
- 2. Why is it the theft of subsidies is called "Leakages"?
- 3. How would DBT prevent the stealing of subsidies?

4. Why do you need UID / "Aadhaar" for DBT?



Questions - 2

- 5. What is the real purpose of UID / "Aadhaar"? Is it for the poor?
- 6. What are the capabilities and limitations of biometric IDs?
- 7. What are the dangers of "centralised" databases?
- 8. Is it better to have a single ID **NUMBER** for ALL purposes linked to ALL databases or different **IDs** for different purposes?



Questions - 3

- 9. From a cyber security point of view, does it make sense to link ALL the records of the Nation's databases through a single index number for each record?
- 10. How could theft of subsidies be prevented?
- 11. What are the dangers of your personal UID / "Aadhaar" data falling into someone else's hands? Is it likely?
- 12. What is UIDAI hiding from the public in deceit?





Our Nation's Sense of Security

Now let's see the sense of security our Nation has and how UIDAI has fooled many and is perhaps, associated in some way with foreign entities

Is there any other explanation for what UIDAI is doing?



Modi with Apple CEO & Apple App






NSA Agreements with US IT Cos

GLENN GREENWALD

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rate partners is one of the most closely guarded secrets in the NSA. The documents containing the key to those code names are vigilantly safeguarded by the agency and Snowden was unable to obtain many of them. Nonetheless, his revelations did unmask some of the companies cooperating with the NSA. Most famously, his archive included the PRISM documents, which detailed secret agreements between the NSA and the world's largest Internet companies—Facebook, Yahool, Apple, Google as well as extensive efforts by Microsoft to provide the agency with access to its communications platforms such as Outlook.

Unlike BLARNEY, FAIRVIEW, OAKSTAR, and STORMBREW, which entail tapping into fiber-optic cables and other forms of infrastructure ("upstream" surveillance, in NSA parlance), PRISM allows the NSA to collect data directly from the servers of nine of the biggest Internet companies:



NO PLACE TO HIDE

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The companies listed on the PRISM slide denied allowing the NSA unlimited access to their servers. Facebook and Google, for instance, claimed that they only give the NSA information for which the agency has a warrant, and tried to depict PRISM as little more than a trivial technical detail: a slightly upgraded delivery system whereby the NSA receives data in a "lockbox" that the companies are legally compelled to provide.

But their argument is belied by numerous points. For one, we know that Yahool vigorously fought in court against the NSA's efforts to force it to join PRISM—an unlikely effort if the program were simply a trivial change to a delivery system. (Yahool's claims were rejected by the FISA court, and the company was ordered to participate in PRISM.) Second, the Washington Poar's Bart Cellman, after receiving heavy criticism for "overstating" the impact of PRISM, reinvestigated the program and confirmed that he stood by the Poar's central claim: "From their workstations anywhere in the world, government employees cleared for PRISM access may 'task' the system"—that is, run a search—"and receive results from an Internet company without further interaction with the company's staff."

Third, the Internet companies' denials were phrased in evasive and legalistic fashion, often obfuscating more than clarifying. For instance, Facebook claimed not to provide "direct access," while Google denied having created a "back door" for the NSA. But as Chris Soghian, the ACLU's tech expert, told *Foreign Policy*, these were highly technical terms of art denoting very specific means to get at information. The companies ultimately did not deny that they had worked with the NSA to set up a system through which the agency could directly access their customers' data.

Finally, the NSA itself has repeatedly hailed PRISM for its unique collection capabilities and noted that the program has been vital for inreasing surveillance. One NSA slide details PRISM's special surveillance powers:



Clause 3.1 Annexure 'B' UIDAI Contract with L 1

2.1. "Upon IIIO's written request, and pursuant to a mutually-agreeable, industry-standard escrow agreement, from the time of commencement of the contract for a period up to 2 years after expiry of contract, Biometric Solution Provider shall plane in escrow; a copy of the source code for the Software, consisting of a full source language statement of the program or programs comprising the Software, in a form suitable for reproduction and use by computer: complete program maintenance documentation, including all technical manuals, release notes; and all other material necessary to allow a reasonably skilled programmer or analyst to understand, maintain, modify and enhance the Software without Biometric Solution Provider's assistance or reference to any other materials. The escrow agreement shall, at a minimum, provide for release of the source code to UID in the event of breach of contract by the Biometric Solution Provider. Biometric Solution Provider, Biometric Solution Provider. Biometric Solution Provider.

3. Privacy of data

3.1. In course of the Agreement, the Biometric Solution Provider may collect, use, transfor, store or otherwise process (collectively, "process") information that pertains to specific individuals and can be linked to them ("personal data"). Biometric Solution Provider warrants that it shall process all personal data in accordance with applicable law and regulation. Biometric Solution Provider further warrants that it shall process such personal information only for the purposes of this Agreement, and shall not use or disclose such information, otherwise pursuant to purposes of the Agreement.

4. Right for security clearance

4.1. UID may execute background checks on any or all employees of the Biometric Solution Provider who are assigned to work on the project. Such background checks will include drug screening and checks for criminal activity, credit history checks, and checks on qualifications, suitability and experience of Biometric Solution Provider's employees before and/or during their assignment to the project under Uis Agreement.

5. 🖌 Opening of registered office in India

8.3. Nanawati, na

5.1. The Biometric Solution Provider should have an office in India in the form of a registered office.

Pape 6 of 7



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


Clause 3.1 Annexure 'B' UIDAI's Contract with L 1

--- the Biometric Solution Provider may <u>collect</u>, <u>use, transfer, store or otherwise process</u> (collectively, "Process") information that <u>pertains to specific individuals</u> and can be linked to them (personal data)



UIDAI Contractor – L 1's Directors



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Questions – 4

- 13. What could foreign entities do if they had access to ALL of UID / "Aadhaar" data?
- 14. What would you do if you knew that foreigners have ALL of UID / "Aadhaar" data?
- 15. How would you like to work to prevent the UID Hoax from doing more damage to ALL of us and the Nation?
- 16.Can UID / "Aadhaar" be used for National security?



What should we do?





Options: Wait & Watch Do nothing **Campaign** against UID





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
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
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How to Campaign





How to Campaign - 2










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How to Campaign - 4

- Talk to explain evils of UID
- Prepare flyers & leaflets & distribute
- Ask organizations to take up issue e.g. – Staff Association





Summary - 1

- UID Biometric IDs are NOT Unique across large populations
 - Cannot be used for social programs
- UIDAI & Government Know this
 - Hence, their motives are evil
- UID does NOT give an Identity
 - It allocates numbers to people & creates a database with these



Summary - 2

- The database is linked using the numbers allocated to people to ALL other national databases
- Foreign private firms Biometric Service Providers (BSPs) are not only given access to ALL data, but are contractually allowed to use, transfer, store & link data to individuals



Summary - 3

- UIDAI & government hide this information from people
- Hence, the UID Scheme is deceitful



Resources

- Biometrics The Difference Engine Dubious Security < <u>http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/10/biometrics ></u>
- ID Cards are the Ultimate Identity Theft <
 <p><u>https://www.google.co.in/webhp?sourceid=chrome-instant&ion=1&espv=2&ie=UTF-8#q=id%20cards%20are%20the%20ultimate%20identity%20theft></u>
- The identity project : an assessment of the UK Identity Cards Bill and it's implications
- < http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/684/ >



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THANK YOU

Monday, August 1, 2016

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